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This paper studies the changes in European stock market indexes composition from 1995 
to 2015. It was found that there are mixed price effects producing abnormal returns around 
the effective replacement of added and deleted stocks. The price pressure hypothesis 
seems to hold for added stocks in some indexes but not for deleted stocks as there is not 
a clear inversion of behaviour after the replacement. Finally, the building and back testing 
of a trading strategy aiming to capture some of those abnormal returns shows it yields a 
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1.   Introduction 
The behaviour of joiners and leavers of major world stock market indexes is already a 
studied topic. Stock index replacements tend to produce price effects and abnormal 
returns around those events. However, most papers focus on the theoretical hypotheses 
which may explain the abnormal returns. This paper not only aims to confirm their 
existence but also tries to put that knowledge into practice by proposing a trading strategy 
to capture those abnormal returns that could be used by hedge funds. 
Stock indexes aggregate stocks which share something in common such as belonging to 
a certain trading exchange, geography or business area. The most popular stock market 
indexes aggregate the biggest stocks in trading exchanges measured by the free-float 
market capitalization and volume of trading such as the American S&P 500, the British 
FTSE-100, the German DAX-30 or the Japanese Nikkei-225.  
Besides the extra awareness any stock gets from being a member of a major stock market 
index, its demand and traded volume may increase automatically due to another reason 
whose explanation follows. Stock market indexes represent the behaviour of the market 
as a whole and therefore they are usually benchmarks for asset managers with which they 
compare their returns. Consequently, to manage risk or to get exposure to the benchmark, 
those agents may want to trade the index directly using futures or a basket of stocks. 
Furthermore, the explosion of passive investment vehicles such as Exchange Traded 
Funds (ETF’s) and Index Funds created another demand source for the members of the 
main stock market indexes. For the security to mimic the behaviour of the index with the 
smallest tracking error possible, it must contain a proportional basket of stocks, i.e. all 
members of the index.  
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This paper focuses on the biggest European stock indexes namely the FTSE-100, the 
EURO STOXX-50, IBEX-35, CAC-40 and DAX-30. All those stock indexes are revised 
periodically to adjust its members to its rules. The rules are specific of each stock index 
and may differ from each other but the main objective of all of them is to aggregate the 
most important and biggest companies in its respective market. Only the EURO STOXX- 
50 differs in the range of stocks, as the objective is the same but all Euro Zone stocks are 
eligible.  
If, as literature suggests, the hypothesis of abnormal returns is verified, then it may be 
possible to trade them in order to profit from these market inefficiencies. 
This study is organized as follows. In Section 2 a literature review is performed and 
several hypotheses are raised to explain possible abnormal returns around the stock 
market indexes replacements. The data used in this study is the subject of Section 3 while 
Section 4 explains the methodology used to assess abnormal returns and how to proceed 
with the structuring of the trading strategy. The results of the performed tests are 
presented in Section 5 and Section 6 draws the main conclusions of the paper.  
2.   Literature Review 
2.1  Existing Hypothesis 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that all prices fully reflect and incorporate 
all the relevant available information so it is not possible to capture abnormal returns in 
such market. However, and according to previous studies on this topic, there may be 
timeframes around additions and deletions where the EMH does not apply meaning that 
opportunities may arise for arbitrageurs to profit from those inefficiencies.  There are 
several hypotheses which could explain price effects around the events of changes in 
index members. The most popular are summarised by Duque and Madeira (2004) and 
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Bildik e Gülay (2001) and try to provide answers to the simple question of why should a 
change in a list lead to price effects in stocks. 
 Price pressure hypothesis: There is extra demand before the effective replacement 
due to index fund managers trying to adjust their portfolio to minimise tracking error. 
However, shortly after the replacement this effect should disappear as a new equilibrium 
is achieved. Blume and Edelen (2004) argue that “to obtain the small tracking errors that 
are actually observed, an indexer must follow very closely an exact replication strategy” 
which consequently creates extra demand for added stocks and decreases the demand for 
deleted stocks.  
 Imperfect substitutes hypothesis: Equilibrium prices will move in order to 
accommodate shifts in the demand curve caused by index funds quasi-compulsory 
ownership of stocks and the consequent decrease of the number of free-float stocks. 
Under this hypothesis these effects are permanent.  
 Information hypothesis (also attention hypothesis): Stocks added to the index will 
increase in price as its trading cost decreases in result of the easier effort to search for 
company news and research. Under this hypothesis the effect is also permanent.  
 Liquidity hypothesis: One assumption of this hypothesis is that volume of trading 
increases after additions which is mostly corroborated by empirical findings (as in Harris 
and Gurel (1986) and Hegde and McDermott (2003)). After the addition and the increase 
in volume traded, investors stop requiring a liquidity premium for holding the added 
stocks because liquidity increases due the narrowing of bid-ask spreads. 
 Selection Criteria Hypothesis: The simple fact of the inclusion (exclusion) is itself 
a positive (negative) signal for investors. Inclusions and exclusion are consequence of 
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stocks meeting selection criteria and that event causes investors to be more (less) 
confident about the future prospects of the company. 
2.2  Empirical findings 
This topic has been studied for a long time and several authors advocate the existence of 
abnormal returns. Using Portuguese stocks traded in the Lisbon Stock Exchange, Duque 
and Madeira (2004) found different price effects for additions and deletions as did Chen, 
Noronha and Singal (2004) using S&P 500 stocks. According to Duque and Madeira 
(2004), added stocks experience an upward trend until the effective replacement takes 
place, after which the behaviour is inverted. These are precisely the same conclusions of 
Bildik e Gülay (2001), Blume and Edelen (2004) and Chakrabarti, et al. (2005). 
Regarding deletions, most papers cannot provide evidence with the same strengh that 
brand additions after the replacement day. Chen, Noronha and Singal (2004) claim that 
this assymetry between the behaviour of added and deleted stocks from the S&P 500 
index has to do with assymetric changes in investor awareness providing evidence of the 
Information Hypothesis. The common conclusion is that stocks deleted from indexes react 
negatively from the announcement until the effective replacement but no effect is clear 
after the deletion. 
3.   Data Description 
Data on 982 events comprising 20 years of additions and deletions of the main European 
stock market indexes was collected from Reuters terminal. The list retrieved contains an 
identification of the event (addition or deletion), a stock identifier and the effective date 
of the event.  
Between all the European stock markets, it was chosen to perform the research on the 
biggest and more popular indexes namely the CAC-40 (France), DAX-30 (Germany), 
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FTSE-100 (United Kingdom), IBEX-35 (Spain) and EURO STOXX-50 (Euro Zone). All 
the rules for additions and deletions are not specified in this paper as they are irrelevant 
for the purpose of the study. The constituency of the indexes and the respective addition 
of the first stocks was chosen not to be included in the study as these additions have a 
different nature and are not consequence of a replacement. The breakdown of those events 
by stock market is important to be mentioned as there are indexes with a significant higher 
number of events due to the higher frequency of the rebalancing. All those 982 are 
summarised in Table 1 both by stock market and by the event’s year. 
Table 1- Description of the number of events used in the study 
 
It is important to stress at this point that for the list gathered for each stock market 
replacements, some events were also not considered due to the lack of reliable stock 
identifiers. Those events, account for a little more than 6% of the 982 total events mainly 
between 1995 and 2003 and are distributed reasonably in a proportional manner between 
the stock market indexes and between joiners and leavers. As such, it was believed that 
this missing data would not significantly alter the main conclusions of paper and the study 
proceeded with the events for which there was reliable data. The date of the effective 
replacement is defined from this point onwards as ED and it will be the reference to define 
the trading days. For each of the events, daily prices between ED-50 and ED+20 were 
retrieved whenever they existed. It may happen that prices do not exist for the whole 
Number of events (Additions; Deletions)
CAC-40 DAX-30 FTSE-100 IBEX-35 EURO STOXX-50 CAC-40 DAX-30 FTSE-100 IBEX-35 EURO STOXX-50
1995 5 ;4 1 ;1 11 ;8 4 ;4 0 ;0 2007 2 ;2 1 ;1 20 ;19 5 ;5 6 ;6
1996 0 ;1 3 ;3 10 ;9 0 ;1 0 ;0 2008 1 ;1 3 ;3 17 ;18 5 ;6 2 ;2
1997 5 ;5 0 ; 14 ;14 5 ;4 0 ;0 2009 1 ;1 4 ;5 17 ;17 1 ;2 2 ;2
1998 3 ;1 2 ;2 14 ;15 5 ;4 1 ;1 2010 2 ;3 1 ;1 13 ;13 2 ;0 2 ;2
1999 8 ;7 1 ;1 16 ;16 3 ;2 10 ;10 2011 2 ;4 2 ;2 11 ;10 4 ;4 4 ;5
2000 4 ;4 2 ;2 32 ;32 6 ;6 5 ;5 2012 2 ;2 3 ;3 7 ;8 2 ;3 3 ;3
2001 2 ;2 4 ;4 18 ;16 4 ;4 3 ;3 2013 1 ;2 0 ;1 10 ;10 5 ;5 2 ;3
2002 2 ;2 2 ;2 13 ;13 2 ;3 1 ;1 2014 1 ;1 0 ; 11 ;10 2 ;2 1 ;1
2003 2 ;3 1 ;1 11 ;8 4 ;5 2 ;2 2015 2 ;2 1 ;1 4 ;5 3 ;3 0 ;0
2004 1 ;1 0 ; 7 ;12 2 ;2 2 ;2
2005 3 ;3 1 ;1 11 ;11 4 ;4 2 ;3
2006 3 ;3 1 ;1 14 ;15 6 ;6 0 ;0
10%% of 
Total
11% 7% 57% 15%
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period because in the case of leavers, due to company events such as bankruptcy or M&A 
events for example, the stock may stop being traded after ED. The same procedure was 
conducted for each event’s respective stock market with daily data on the index price 
being retrieved between ED-50 and ED+20. 
The dataset of this study comprises series of stock prices and index prices from which 
series of daily returns for each event were calculated for stocks and indexes.  
4.   Methodology 
4.1 Event Study 
The first stage of this study is to confirm the empirical findings mentioned in the section 
above. To do so, the first step is to define a model for the normal returns so that excess 
returns are considered abnormal returns. For simplicity and because the ultimate goal of 
the study is to propose an easy to implement trading strategy, the market adjusted returns 
model was chosen to define abnormal returns as follows: 
 𝐴𝑅#,% = 	  𝑅#,% − 𝑅)%           (1) 
with ARi,t being the abnormal return of stock i on day t, Ri,t the arithmetic return of stock 
i at day t and Rmt the index arithmetic return on day t. 
After computing series for abnormal returns, everything is set to perform tests in order to 
assess the significance of those returns. It is clear that the null hypothesis of these tests is 
the absence of abnormal returns, i.e. null abnormal returns. However, before performing 
hypothesis tests one needs to have a first glance at the results so that alternative hypothesis 
can be formulated. As such, the average abnormal return is computed for each day by 
index and by type of event (additions and deletions) in order to have a sense of the 
behaviour that should be tested in the first place. With those daily average abnormal 
returns one can compute a cumulative series rebased at 100% on ED to simplify any 
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comparison. Depending on the evidence from the first approach and from the empirical 
findings presented in Section 2, the procedure tests if the null hypothesis of non-existent 
abnormal returns is true for different periods of time. The dataset is also divided by index 
so that it is possible to identify different behaviours in different indexes. 
Event studies usually face a problem which is the non-stationarity of returns series when 
the event alters the variance as well as the mean of returns because it creates problems 
with the conventional hypothesis tests to the mean. As such, the series is only tested after 
being standardized using the Boehmer, Masumeci and Poulsen (1991) standardized cross-
sectional test (BMP) as they provide evidence of the vulnerability of standard hypothesis 
tests to the mean of a series in a period of abnormal volatility. Furthermore, they prove 
that the standardization of returns decreases the probability of a Type I error, rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it is indeed true. In practice, standardization under the BMP 
imply “that more volatile (i.e., noisier) observations get less weight in the averaging than 
the less volatile and hence more reliable observations” (Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). This 
procedure transforms the series in a stationary process thus conventional hypothesis tests 
can be applied. Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) argue that the BMP is not optimal as it does 
not account for cross-sectional correlation. These problems arise particularly when the 
event for all stocks is the same day. In this case however, those warnings about cross-
sectional correlation were ignored because the dataset relates to different periods of time 
as the effective date of replacement is not the same for all stocks. 
The BMP transforms abnormal returns (AR) into standardized abnormal returns (SAR) in 




         (2) 
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where 𝜎# is the standard deviation from the estimation period which was chosen to be the 
range between ED-40 and ED-11.  
 𝜎# = 	  
1
(𝑇−1) (𝐴𝑅#,% − 𝐴𝑅#,%
2
%34 )      (3) 
Making use of equation (2) and (3) and by adding a term to adjust the forecast error, SARi,t  
can thus be defined as: 
 𝑆𝐴𝑅#,% =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡







       (4) 
where: Rme is the market return for day e of the estimation period (for each stock event 
market return is consider the respective stock market where the event happened); 𝑅)	   is 
the average market return during the estimation period; Rmt is the market return in day t; 
Rme is the market return in day t and Ti is the number of days in the estimation period. 
With the series of SARi,t  one can perform a one-tailed test to the mean to check the 
following hypothesis: 
H0: SARi,t  = 0 
H1: SARi,t  < 0  or  H1: SARi,t  > 0 depending on what the first approach suggests. 








           (5) 
Both the periods before and after the event are tested. It is also tested the full sample and 
only the 2nd half to make sure results are consistent throughout the whole sample. A 
critical analysis to the results of these tests is performed in order to proceed to the 
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structuring of the trading strategy. This critical analysis is of great importance as it draws 
the first conclusions regarding what happens around the additions and deletions of stocks. 
4.2  Trading Strategy 
Building up on the results of the previous stage, a trading strategy is structured and back 
tested. Following the same simplicity mind-set described above and more importantly, to 
avoid the phenomenon of over fitting there are some key guidelines for the structuring.  
a)   Because all the study of returns is performed using daily data, there is not any sort 
of intraday orders to trade;  
b)   Following the same rationale related to the nature of the study performed, all the 
positions taken are in spreads between the stock and the market where the event takes 
place. Any long position in any stock has a short position in the broad index and vice-
versa for short positions in stocks. In practice, this imposition should offset any market 
effect as it constitutes a market risk hedging with a market beta = 1; 
c)   Unless the previous study provides strong evidence of different behaviours among 
different indexes, the same strategy is to be pursued in all indexes; 
d)   In practice, there is an announcement date (AD) from which onwards it is publicly 
known the changes in indexes’ membership. That announcement happens typically about 
2 months before the effective replacement but that time difference may vary due to special 
circumstances i.e. M&A events or bankruptcy or by different index specific rules. Due to 
the fact that the data collected lacks that AD, and after research about the rules of the used 
indexes, a conservative approach was taken considering reasonable to assume that at the 
day ED-10 it was already publicly known the event to occur 10 days later. To make sure 
that no forward looking information is being used when building the strategy, it is 
imposed that only after ED-10 inclusive it is possible to start trading regarding that event. 
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e)   The last guideline has to do with leverage and trading costs. Trading costs do exist 
in the real world and they cannot be disregarded so the back test tries to mimic exactly 
what would happen in the real trading of the strategy. A trading cost of 7 b.p. is accounted 
for every time a new position is opened or closed in any stock or stock market index (via 
futures market). Therefore, if a position is opened in 2 spreads within the same stock 
market, on the day of the opening it is subtracted to the daily return 3 * 7 b.p. in result of 
the trading of 2 stocks and 1 stock market future. By default, in the back test a position 
of 20% of the whole portfolio is set in all spreads regardless of the number of spreads 
being traded in any day. This means that there may exist days with only 20% of portfolio 
exposure if only 1 event is being traded or 200% of exposure if 10 events are being traded 
at the same time. This was considered a better solution rather than having always a 100% 
exposure. Imposing a constant exposure would mean that all events would not have the 
same weight because the number of events happening at the same time is obviously not 
constant. Trading costs often ruin trading strategies as they offset all the profits. One way 
to go around this problem is to increase leverage, i.e. the exposure of the strategy, and 
this instrument may be used if a strategy has everything to be successful but trading costs 
are offsetting all returns. 
Provided that the strategy follows these guidelines, its results are analysed to assess if the 
evidence from the event study proves itself to have been successful in the past years. After 
building the first strategy the results are criticised and improvements suggested so that an 
optimal result is achieved. The back test uses the whole sample but the years since 2010 
(1995-2009) so that the same strategy can be applied with the last 5 years (2010-2015) in 
order to test the strategy out-of-sample. Throughout the analysis of the tests’ results 
several metrics are observed: 
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a)   The magnitude of the returns measured by Sharpe Ratio (SR) without subtracting 
the risk-free return as our strategy does not consume capital (it is always a long-short 
portfolio); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑆𝑅 = 	   𝑅𝑡𝜎𝑅𝑡
                       (6)  
b)   The generation of positive alpha according to the Fama-French 3 Factors Model 
with Momentum Factor or, the Carhart 4 Factors Model (C4F). It is an extension of the 
popular CAPM and aims to explain portfolio returns based on 4 different risk-factors: 
market (MKT-RF), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (WML) factors. European 
risk-factors data were retrieved from Kenneth R. French’s website which contains a 
monthly database. Monthly returns of the strategy were computed and regressed as 
follows: 
 𝑅#,% = 𝛼# + 	  𝛽4,# ∗ 𝑅),% − 𝑟𝑓% + 𝛽@,# ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵% + 𝛽C,# ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿% + 	  𝛽F,# ∗ 𝑊𝑀𝐿%                      (7) 
c)   Other issues that concern hedge fund managers such as the maximum drawdown 
(the highest possible loss over the analysis period) and whether the strategy’s returns are 
continuous over time and are not clustered in a specific period of time. 
5.   Results 
5.1  Event Study 
Following the methodology presented in Section 4, the existence of abnormal returns 
measured in excess of the market was assessed previously with a simple mean behaviour 
analysis using the whole sample. The results for additions and deletions are present in 
Figure 1: 
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Figure 1 – Mean behavior rebased at 100 on ED of added stocks (left) and deleted stocks (right) 
 
Concerning additions to the indexes, it appears that there is a price effect around ED with 
positive abnormal returns before ED and an inversion slightly before ED. Before the 
replacement, the first quick conclusion is that this positive price effect is more noticeable 
in IBEX-35 and EURO STOXX-50 which tend to invert 1 day before ED. After the 
inversion, despite the fact that IBEX-35 has again one of the most evident negative 
behaviours, the CAC-40 also stands out. 
The same procedure was conducted for deletions. While there was a clear indication of 
the behaviour around additions, in this case the conclusion is not straightforward. Some 
indexes such as the IBEX-35, the FTSE-100 and the EURO STOXX-50 seem to have a 
negative behaviour before ED inverting also 1 day before the event. For the other indexes 
it is hard to draw a first conclusion because neither before nor after the event there is a 
clear trend.  
With these first quick results, one can proceed to the hypothesis tests with the explained 
BMP standardization procedure. 40 different tests were performed (2 periods for the 5 
indexes with full sample and only 2nd half) divided between additions and deletions. For 
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additions, two different periods which seem to be those with more pronounced behaviour 
were tested: 
a)   Before ED: from ED-10 to ED-1 the alternative hypothesis of positive abnormal 
returns was tested; 
b)   After ED: from ED to ED+6 the alternative hypothesis of negative abnormal 
returns was tested; 
Since in the case of deletions there is not a clear behaviour the same tests were performed 
in the following symmetrical windows: 
a)   Before ED: from ED-10 to ED-1 the alternative hypothesis of negative abnormal 
returns was tested; 
b)   After ED: from ED to ED+10 the alternative hypothesis of positive abnormal 
returns was tested. 
It was performed a simple one-tailed T-test to SARi,t with a significance level of 5% and 
10%. The level of 10% was chosen because these tests’ goal is to reject only those events 
that clearly should not be included in the trading strategy due to the inexistence of 
abnormal returns. By increasing the significance level, one is indirectly reducing the 
probability of committing a Type II error, rejecting the null hypothesis incorrectly. The 
results (t-statistics) of the hypothesis tests ran for the full sample by type of event 
(addition or deletion) and by stock index are presented in Table 2: 
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Table 2 – T-statistics for hypothesis tests using full and only 2nd half of sample (* indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level) 
 
Different results regarding additions and deletions were reached. Deletions are the first 
subject of analysis. In the case of the DAX-30, one cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
zero abnormal returns not only before but also after ED. As far as other indexes are 
concerned, in the period before ED all the tests indicated negative abnormal returns while 
after ED, none of the indexes suggested a clear inversion of behaviour. The analysis on 
the 2nd half of the sample is even opposing results found using the whole sample. 
In terms of additions the results were much more constant across indexes, which gives 
extra robustness to the results of this analysis when compared to deletions. It is observed 
a clear rejection of the null hypothesis for both periods before ED and after ED with the 
exception of events before ED taking place in the DAX-30. These tests suggested that the 
behaviour of the DAX-30 is clearly different from all other stock indexes so the stocks 
added to the DAX-30 were excluded from the trading strategy. Clearly, the price pressure 
hypothesis presented in the literature review seems to hold for added stocks. These results 
also corroborate what other studies have concluded. 
It is important to keep in mind at this point that despite the fact that some tests reject the 
null hypothesis with higher “confidence” due to lower p-value, and hence lower 
probability of committing a Type I error, it does not mean directly that the magnitude of 
those abnormal returns are higher. In other words, these tests only reject the null 
CAC-40 DAX-30 FTSE-100 IBEX-30 EURO STOXX-50
ED-10 to ED-1 2.51**; 1.31* 0,59; -0,17 6.14**; 4.81** 5.50**; 2.47** 6.22**; 4.80**
ED to ED+6 -4.40**; -3.11** -1.55*; -1.58** -6.46**; -3.81** -4.16**; -2.57** -2.06**; -1.58*
CAC-40 DAX-30 FTSE-100 IBEX-30 EURO STOXX-50
ED-10 to ED-1 -1.35*; 0,65 1,08; 1.70** -5.29**; -2.48** -2.82**; -1.50* -2.32**; -2.26**
ED to ED+6 0,97; -0,65 -0,68; -0,69 2.37**; -1.48* -0,42; -0,16 1.52*; -0,51
Panel - Additions: Full Sample ; 2nd Half of Sample
Panel - Deletions: Full Sample ; 2nd Half of Sample
	   17	  
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns and do not aim to rank indexes based on the 
magnitude of abnormal returns. That magnitude of returns is tangible in the results of the 
trading strategy and is assessed in the following sections. 
The study proceeds to the next stage with the structuring and back test of a trading 
strategy, with the following takeaways: 
a)   DAX-30 was excluded from both the additions and deletions sample; 
b)   The behaviour in the periods around additions is clear for all other indexes thus 
all of them are to be back tested; 
c)   The behaviour in the periods before deletions is also clear and negative for all 
indexes but the DAX-30 so they should also be back tested in the following stage; 
d)   The behaviour in the periods after deletions is not clear as the null hypothesis is 
almost rejected. As such, the period after deletions was excluded in the building of the 
trading strategy. 
5.2  Trading Strategy Structuring 
The back test of investment strategies is very useful as it illustrates the results of that 
strategy if it was implemented in the past. One can always argue that past performance 
does not guarantee future returns but it is one of the few ways to test if any strategy works 
of if it does not. Furthermore, until now only the existence of abnormal returns was tested 
which by itself is not a sufficient condition to justify the existence of an investable 
strategy. The magnitude of those returns may not be enough to beat a benchmark or to 
compensate the investor for taking risk, i.e. volatility of his portfolio. The back test aims 
to assess exactly these issues that an investor bears in mind. 
In this study several back tests were performed in order to assess which strategy 
performed better in the past and to recommend a trading strategy for the future. It was 
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used as a benchmark the stock market index EURO STOXX-50 so that one can compare 
the cumulative performance of the strategy and the main metrics computed. 
It was chosen to start by including all the events not discarded in previous tests in the 
back test investing in the spread between stocks and the stock market where the event 
takes place as explained in Section 4. As such, the strategy trades both additions and 
deletions in the CAC-40, IBEX-35, FTSE-100 and EURO STOXX-50 in the periods before 
and after ED in the case of additions and only before ED in the case of deletions (Strategy 
1). Figure 2 illustrates Strategy 1 and its results are summarised in Table 3:  
Figure 2 – Timeline of trading in Strategy 1 
 
Table 3 - Strategy 1’s metrics for the 1995-2009 period (* indicates significance at the 5% level) 
 
As expected due to the previous statistical tests, this strategy generates positive returns 
with an SR of 1.50 and a significant (5% significance level) positive alpha of 28% 
annualised. In fact, returns are abnormally high with an average annual return above 28%. 
However, this spectacular performance comes at the expense of a very high maximum 
drawdown above 40% which is clearly too high. Reducing leverage to a 10% exposure 
per event (default exposure is 20%) does not seem to improve the output as it decreases 
ED
Start of long 
position in the 
spread
End of long 
position in the 
spread
ED-1ED-10
Timeline for Additions investment
ED+6
End of short 
position in the 
spread
Start of short 
position in the 
spread
ED
Start of long 
position in the 
spread
End of long 
position in the 
spread
ED-1ED-10
Timeline for Deletions investment
ED+6
STRATEGY 1 (1995-2009)
Strategy Benchmark Risk-Factors Regression (monthly returns)
Average Annual Return 28,3% 7,8% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 18,8% 23,0% Coefficient 2,31% -0,01 -0,47 -0,14 0,28
Sharpe Ratio 1,50 0,34 S.E. 0,48% 0,09 0,18 0,18 0,10
Maximum Drawdown -40,4% -66,9% T-statistic 4,84* -0,14 -2,58* -0,79 2,78*
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SR to 0.95 and only reduces the maximum drawdown to 22%. This value is still 
considered to be higher than desired thus 3 options were considered: 
1.   Exclude the period before ED in deletions as their behaviour was not significant 
for events in the CAC-40 and because evidence from the statistical tests was not as strong 
as was evidence from additions (Strategy 2); 
2.   Exclude FTSE-100 events as it is an index with much more additions and deletions 
which may lead to a higher number of arbitrageurs trying to profit from these same 
behaviours and because it increases the expenses in trading costs (Strategy 3); 
3.   Join both 2 and 3 excluding deletions and events in the FTSE-100 (Strategy 4). 
The results for Strategies 2, 3 and 4 are summarised in Table 4: 
Table 4 - Strategy 2, 3 and 4 metrics for the 1995-2009 period (* indicates significance at the 5% level) 
 
All strategies improve the results when it comes to decreasing the maximum drawdown 
and increasing SR and despite the fact that they generate lower alphas, they are still 
STRATEGY 2 (1995-2009)
Strategy Benchmark Risk-Factors Regression
Average Annual Return 21.3% 7.8% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 13.3% 23.0% Coefficient 1.90% 0.08 -0.23 -0.31 0.13
Sharpe Ratio 1.60 0.34 S.E. 0.36% 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.08
Maximum Drawdown -25.2% -66.9% T-statistic 5,34* 1.09 -1.65 -2,33* 1.75
STRATEGY 3 (1995-2009)
Average Annual Return 13.1% 7.8% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 8.5% 23.0% Coefficient 1.13% 0.13 -0.12 -0.25 0.10
Sharpe Ratio 1.53 0.34 S.E. 0.24% 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.05
Maximum Drawdown -12.0% -66.9% T-statistic 4,65* 2,76* -1.32 -2,71* 1.95
STRATEGY 4 (1995-2009)
Average Annual Return 11.8% 7.8% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 7.1% 23.0% Coefficient 1.06% 0.11 -0.13 -0.28 0.10
Sharpe Ratio 1.67 0.34 S.E. 0.24% 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.05
Maximum Drawdown -11.9% -66.9% T-statistic 4,45* 2,41* -1.39 -3,20* 2,04*
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significant and positive for all strategies. However, excluding deletions and events in the 
FTSE-100 is the best option. 
It was performed the back test for Strategy 4 out-of-sample in the period 2010-2015 to 
check whether these positive results remained. The positive trend remained but in a lower 
magnitude. In fact, a simple one-tailed T-test at 5% significance level to the series of 
strategy’s returns could not reject the hypothesis of zero returns. Consequently, it was 
performed the same strategy without trading costs to check whether the bad performance 
is due to trading costs and this hypothesis was confirmed. Without trading costs, during 
the period 2010-2015 Strategy 4 still generated significant alpha with an SR of 1.17. As 
explained in Section 4, leverage can be increased so that trading costs do not offset all 
returns. As such, leverage was increased to a level of 50% weight in every trade and the 
results show that it has still been possible to trade successfully this strategy since 2010 
and to beat the market according to the C4F Model. Possible reasons to explain the lower 
success of the strategy in the past years are suggested in Section 6. Results for the out-of-
sample back test follow: 
Table 5 - Strategy 4’s metrics with and without trading costs for the 2010-2015 period (* indicates significance 
at the 5% level) 
	  
STRATEGY 4 (2010-2015) with trading costs
Strategy Benchmark Risk-Factors Regression
Average Annual Return 2.7% 4.0% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 3.9% 21.7% Coefficient 0.28% -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.01
Sharpe Ratio 0.69 0.18 S.E. 0.17% 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.06
Maximum Drawdown -6.2% -35.0% T-statistic 1.67 -0.60 -0.32 0.71 -0.12
STRATEGY 4 (2010-2015) without trading costs
Average Annual Return 4.6% 4.0% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 3.9% 21.7% Coefficient 0.47% -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.02
Sharpe Ratio 1.17 0.18 S.E. 0.18% 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.06
Maximum Drawdown -5.2% -35.0% T-statistic 2,54* -0.65 -0.40 0.67 -0.29
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Table 6 - Strategy 4’s metric with trading costs and with increased leverage for the 2009-2015 period (* 
indicates significance at the 5% level) 
 
5.3 Proposed Strategy’s Analysis 
The strategy which increased the weight of every trade to 50% from 2010 onwards is 
referred as from now on as Strategy 5. Cumulative performance of Strategy 5 using the 
whole sample is illustrated in Figure 3: 
Figure 3 - Strategy 5 cumulative performance vs EURO STOXX-50 over the 1995-2015 period rebased at 
100% 
 
Looking at the chart, one can highlight another two positive points of the strategy. Firstly, 
the fact that returns are not affected during periods of strong losses in the EURO STOXX-
50 such as the 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 periods. In those periods, the cumulative 
performance remained quite stable which is very appealing to hedge fund managers 
seeking to protect capital during crisis. Another important aspect has to do with the 
clustering of returns in a specific period of time which did not happen: returns were 
STRATEGY 4 (2010-2015) with trading costs and increased leverage
Risk-Factors Regression
Average Annual Return 9.5% 4.0% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 9.7% 21.7% Coefficient 1.00% -0.06 -0.09 0.15 -0.04
Sharpe Ratio 0.98 0.18 S.E. 0.44% 0.10 0.23 0.22 0.16
Maximum Drawdown -13.6% -35.0% T-statistic 2,24* -0.67 -0.39 0.69 -0.24
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constant over time which is also another goal hedge fund managers seek. Using the whole 
sample, the results of Strategy 5 are presented in the Table 7: 
Table 7 - Strategy 5's metrics for the 1995-2015 period (* indicates significance at 5% level) 
 
As expected after a closer look at the comparison between the cumulative performance 
of the strategy and the cumulative performance of the benchmark, and despite being 
significantly positive (t-statistic is 2.18), the market coefficient from the C4F regression 
is very small. According to the regression, a portfolio following this strategy is exposed 
to only 9% of the market swings which is especially important during crisis. At a 5% 
significance level, SMB and WMB factors are not significantly different from 0 while the 
value factor HML is negative and significant with a value of -20% meaning the portfolio 
is capturing negatively the returns provided from a value portfolio. Lastly, it is important 
to stress the fact that the strategy not only had a higher SR but also a lower maximum 
drawdown when compared to the benchmark, the EURO STOXX-50. 
5.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
Not only it is important to check how the proposed strategy performed but also to see how 
results change if inputs are slightly changed. This sensitivity analysis checks how do SR 
and the significance of alphas (measured by the t-statistic) react to different periods of 
trading. Start day of the long position in the spread for additions ranges from ED-11 until 
ED-8 and the end of the short position ranges from ED+5 until ED+8. Table 8 summarises 
results: 
STRATEGY 5 (1995-2015) 
Strategy Benchmark Risk-Factors Regression (monthly returns)
Average Annual Return 11,1% 6,7% Alpha MKT-RF SMB HML WML
Annual Volatility 7,9% 22,6% Coefficient 0,93% 0,09 -0,11 -0,20 0,08
Sharpe Ratio 1,41 0,30 S.E. 0,20% 0,04 0,09 0,08 0,05
Maximum Drawdown -13,6% -66,9% T-statistic 4,55* 2,18* -1,25 -2,52* 1,63
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Table 8 - Sensitivity analysis to SR and significance of alpha when changing the start and end of the trading 
periods 
 
As it is observable, the main results are very stable when small changes happen with the 
periods of trading. SR stays persistently above 1.3 while alpha generation is also always 
clear significantly positive. One can consequently conclude that the proposed strategy is 
not an isolated sweet spot with results that vanish when small input changes happen. 
6.   Summary and Conclusions 
Companies change over time. Some experience an incredible increase in its market value 
while others become irrelevant or even disappear. Therefore, stock market indexes’ 
composition is changed over time to ensure a proper reflection of the broad market. This 
study aimed to check whether these events produced abnormal returns in added and 
deleted stocks as suggested by literature. Furthermore, it tried to structure an attractive 
trading strategy for a hedge fund to apply. 
This study analysed the return of stocks in excess of the market of both added and deleted 
stock around the effective replacement date. Events ranging from 1995 until 2015 within 
the most popular European indexes (CAC-40, DAX-30, FTSE-100, IBEX-35 and EURO 
STOXX-50) were subject of the analysis. 
The study found that changes in index composition indirectly affect stock excess returns 
as suggested in the literature.  
There is evidence of the theory of price pressure suggested in the literature for added 
stocks with the exception of events in the DAX-30. Stocks added to other indexes have 
5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8
-11 1.30 1.35 1.36 1.31 4.17 4.31 4.43 4.29
-10 1.37 1.41 1.42 1.36 4.41 4.55 4.67 4.51
-9 1.36 1.40 1.41 1.35 4.40 4.53 4.66 4.51














End of short position (day) End of short position (day)
Alpha's significance (t-statistic)Sharpe Ratio
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statistically significant positive excess returns until a day before ED. After ED, events in 
all analysed indexes generate negative and statistically significant excess returns. 
Regarding deletions, results are mixed. In the period before ED only the FTSE-100, IBEX-
35 and the EURO STOXX-50 show negative excess returns. After ED it is not possible to 
draw any significant conclusion.  
It was also observed a decrease in the significance of results when testing only the 2nd 
half of the sample which may indicate that these abnormal returns are being already traded 
by arbitrageurs. However, it was still possible to successfully trade and generate alpha 
since 2010 by increasing the weight of the trades. 
The proposed trading strategy was back tested with trading costs and includes only 
additions in the CAC-40, IBEX-35 and EURO STOXX-50 as including FTSE-100 and 
deletions generated a large drawdown which cannot be recommended. It trades the 
spreads between the stocks and the stock market index where the event takes place with 
a long position in the spread from ED-10 to ED-1 and a short position from ED to ED+6. 
Back tested for the whole sample, the strategy yields a Sharpe Ratio of 1.41 and generates 
an annualised alpha of 11%. For the period from 2010 onwards, Sharpe Ratio decreases 
to 0.98 while alpha slightly increases to 12% proving the attractiveness of the strategy 
also in the past years. These positive results are not changed with small changes of the 
inputs (start and end day of the trading strategy). Moreover, the strategy’s results are 
stable when small changes in the start and end day of the strategy occur. Finally, it seems 
to react positively during crisis and to generate continuous returns over time. 
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